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NOTES AND COMMENTS 

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRE­
SUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS AFFORDED STATUTORY PRECEDENTS 
AND DEFERENCE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Stare decisis literally means "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided 
cases." 1 There is no federal statute which requires stare decisis,2 nor is 
it a rule of law. Rather, stare decisis is a matter of public policy,3 the 
importance of which is undisputed in Anglo-Americanjurisprudence.4 
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990); see Pound, What 0/Stare Deci­
sis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 6 (1941) ("The decision of the ultimate court of review in a 
common-law jurisdiction is held to bind all inferior courts of that jurisdiction ...."); Note, 
Stare Decisis in Courts 0/ Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. REv. 409, 413 (1924). 
2. The United States Code allows the Supreme Court to review lower court decisions 
two ways: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party ...; [or] 
(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law 
... as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme 
Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for 
decision of the entire matter in controversy. 
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). This implies that only the 
Supreme Court may reverse lower court decisions or remand the case with instructions. 
See generally Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law o/the Case, 21 
TEX. L. REv. 514, 525 (1943) ("A decision of the United States Supreme Court is binding 
on federal matters on all other courts, federal or state. "); Note, Stare Decisis and the Lower 
Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 504,507 (1959). 
3. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis­
senting) ("Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more impor­
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."), overruled in 
part on other graunds, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 369-70 (1938) and 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938); Geohegan v. Union 
Elevated R.R., 266 Ill. 482,496, 107 N.E. 786, 793 (1915). 
4. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The essence 
of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare decisis is that the rule of the case creates a 
binding legal precept. The doctrine is so central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that it 
scarcely need be mentioned, let alone discussed at length."); see Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (Several factors underlying stare decisis include re­
spect for the judicial system, certainty in the application of laws, and fairness and expedi­
tiousness in the administration of justice.); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389-402 
(1943) (more important to follow precedent, even though it be unsatisfactory, in order to 
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One narrow aspect of stare decisis focuses on statutory prece­
dent.S Compared to common law precedents and constitutional prece­
dents,6 statutory precedents are given a strong presumption of 
correctness.7 This presumption may be rebutted, however, "by 
avoid the unfortunate practical results of changing the rule); H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & 
A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD 5 (1980) (explaining the role of stare decisis in common law 
systems); Comment, Judicial Precedents.-A Short Study in Comparative Jurisprudence., 9 
MARV. L. REv. 27, 35-36 (1895) ("[I]t is law in England and in the United States that, 
apart from its intrinsic merits, the decision of a court . . . is absolutely binding on all 
inferior courts."). But see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 
1361 (1988) ("Stare deCisis ... has been considered by American courts to be more a rule of 
thumb than an ironfisted command."); Moore & Oglebay, supra note 2, at 539 (An Ameri­
can court does not feel itself "inexorably bound by its own precedents. "). 
5. See generally Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1363. 
6. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Since we deal with a constitutional 
question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas 
of the law."); see Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. 
L. REv. 151, 152-55 (1958) (Supreme Court overruled past precedent at least 90 times 
between 1810 and 1957, 60 of which involved constitutional precedents); Douglas, Stare 
Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735, 743 (1949) (Supreme Court overruled constitutional 
precedents 21 times between 1937 and 1949); Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: 
Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 123, 127 (1985) (Stare 
decisis is not applied rigidly in constitutional cases because "constitutional law is thought 
to be a living instrument of public policy adaptable to changing circumstances. "); Maltz, 
Some Thoughts on the Death o/Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 467, 
467 (Supreme Court overruled constitutional precedents at least 47 times between 1959 and 
1979); see also Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling 0/ Constitutional Decisions in the 
Warren Year.f, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 101, 112-26 (1969) (A survey of precedents overruled by 
the Warren Court and accompanying rationales for their decisions). 
7. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989) ("Considerations 
of stare decisis have special force in the area of,statutory interpretation ...."); Square D 
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,424 (1986) (The six decades that 
have passed "are insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of continued validity that 
adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute."); see, e.g., NLRB v. International Long­
shoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985) ("(W]e should follow the normal presumption of 
stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720, 736 (1977) ("[W]e must bear in mind that considerations ofstare decisis weigh heavily 
in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpre­
tation of its legislation. "). 
Several writers have commented on the distinction between the presumption of cor­
rectness afforded statutory precedent as compared to constitutional precedent. For exam­
ple, one commentator noted: 
The doctrine of finality for prior decisions setting the course for the interpre­
tation of a statute is not always followed .... Nevertheless, the doctrine remains 
as more than descriptive. More than any other doctrine in the field of precedent, 
it has served to limit the freedom of the court. It marks an essential difference 
between statutory interpretation on the one hand and case law and constitutional 
interpretation on' the other. 
Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. SOl, 540 (1948), quoted in 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 n.34 (1986); Mar­
shall, "Let Congress Do It':' The Case For An Absolute Rule 0/Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989) (advocating an absolute rule that only Congress has the 
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changed circumstances which render the statutory precedent not only 
inconsistent with original legislative expectations and evolving statu­
tory policy, but indeed counterproductive to current policy."8 
When courts are faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, 
they look to precedent for guidance; they also look to the agency 
charged with administering the statute. An agency will often have 
taken a position on a particular issue through the issuance of an inter­
pretative rule.9 When judicial precedent and an interpretative rule dif­
power to overrule the Court's interpretation of federal statutes); see R. KEETON, VENTUR­
ING TO Do JUSTICE 79 (1969) ("Can and should the court overrule its earlier [statutory] 
interpretational decision, subject only to the same limitations it would apply in overruling 
one of its common law decisions? Not so, say many courts and writers."); Eskridge, supra 
note 4, at 1363 (suggesting the super-strong presumption should be abandoned and re­
placed with an "evolutive" approach which the· Court has suggested in constitutional 
cases); Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool 0/Judiciol Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REv. 247 
(1947) (supporting super-strong presumption given statutory precedents); Rogers, Judicial 
Reinterpretation o/Statutes: The Example 0/Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. 
REv. 611, 626 (1977) (Stare decisis should be adhered to more strictly in statutory cases 
than in common law or constitutional cases.); see also Maltz, The Nature 0/Precedent, 66 
N.C.L. REv. 367, 388-89 (1988) (criticizing the Court's reasons in distinguishing between 
statutory, common law, and constitutional precedents); Note, The Power That Shall Be 
Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. 
REv. 345, 370-71 (1986) (supporting presumption of validity in statutory precedent, but 
disagreeing with the presumption in constitutional cases). But see R. DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-55 (1975) (criticizing super-strong 
presumption afforded statutory precedents). 
8. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1364. The precedent should not be overruled unless the 
original reasons for the rule have disappeared or have been weakened, the rule has been 
persuasively criticized, and practical experience shows the original goals are being under­
mined by the existing rule. Id. The precedent should not be overruled, however, if there 
has been "substantial legislation or private reliance on the rule." Id.; see Welch v. Texas 
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-79 (1987) (Court overruled Parden 
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), but refused to overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890), Ex parte New York, No. I, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), and cases relying on them. Hans 
and the line of cases that followed will not be overruled in the absence of "special justifica­
tion" for such a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis.); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 
U.S. 219, 224-30 (1987) (The Court ovei-ruIed Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 
How.) 66 (1861). Due to the passage of time, the fundamental holding of Dennison was not 
representative of the current law because it was decided during the Civil War when state 
secession was threatening and the federal government's power was at its lowest point.). 
9. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The ppwer of an administrative 
agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the forma­
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con­
gress."); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:11, at 55 (2d ed. 1979) 
("When Congress enacts a statute and assigns the administration of it to an agency, the 
agency encounters questions the statute does not answer and the agency must answer them. 
The agency heads must instruct their staffs what to do about such questions ....."); Bon­
field, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making 0/Interpretative Rules 
and General Statements 0/ Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101,118 (1971) 
("An active agency with a broad mandate ... may formally or informally take positions on 
literally hundreds of questions with regard to the proper construction of the statutes or 
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fer, courts are iIi a peculiar situation that calls for a delicate balancing 
of policies. 
Although courts may be bound, to an extent, by precedent, and 
almost absolutely bound by a legislative rule,lO an interpretative rule is 
not binding on the courts. I I Even though not binding, courts may give 
an interpretative rule authoritative effect. 12 
Courts sometimes give authoritative effect to an interpretative 
rule when they agree with the agency}3 Similarly, courts will defer to 
the agency when the courts lack sufficient expertise and are satisfied 
with the agency's rule. 14 Likewise, courts may defer to the agency 
regulations it administers each month."); Saunders, Agency Interpretations and Judicial 
Review: A Search for Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given Agency Statutory Con­
structions, 30 Alllz. L. REv. 769, 770 (1988) (''The rules an agency issues in its efforts to 
inform its staff and the public in the course of its statutory construction are known as 
interpretative rules."). 
10. Legislative rules have been described as "the product of an exercise of delegated 
legislative power to make law through rules." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:8, at 36. 
Legislative rules are set aside only if "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, 
or immunity; [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 
of statutory right .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1988). 
11. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We consider that the rul­
ings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not control­
ling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."); 2 K. 
DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59. 
The Administrative Procedure Act suggested that interpretative rules were to have 
little effect on a court's statutory construction. It originally stated, "[s]o far as necessary to 
decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicabil­
ity of the terms of any agency action." Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 100e), 60 
Stat. 237, 243 (1946). The law currently states: "To the extent necessary to decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary further explained that the "subsection pro­
vides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analy­
sis." S. REp. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 185,214 (1946). The report of the House Com­
mittee on the Judiciary gives the same explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 6 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY 233, 278 (1946). The Senate Committee also explained that" 'interpretative' rules­
as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review, 
whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion." SENATE 
CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CoNG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1946), reprinted in AD­
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11, 18 (1946) (emphasis added). 
12. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59. 
13. Id. 
14. Id.; see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970) ("While ... HEW's con­
struction commands less than the usual deference that may be accorded an administrative 
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depending upon the date of the creation of the interpretative rule. If 
the rule has been longstanding, courts may be less reluctant to adopt 
it. IS 
If the courts do not give the agency interpretation authoritative 
effect, the courts may give the interpretation varying degrees of defer­
ence, ranging from "the greatest deference"16 to virtually no defer­
enceP Reviewing courts are also free to substitute their own 
judgment for the content of the interpretative rule. IS 
Because there is no administrative rule of stare decisis,19 an 
agency is free to change its interpretative rule even after the Supreme 
Court has ruled on a particular interpretation of the rule. When the 
two rules differ, lower courts must then determine whether to follow 
interpretation based on its expertise, it is entitled to weight as the attempt of an experienced 
agency to harmonize an obscure enactment with the basic structure of a program it ad­
ministers."); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("A 
high degree [of deference] is appropriate ... when the agency's expertise can help in assess­
ing the effects of competing interpretations upon the policies of the statute ...."); National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[D]eference is not a uni­
tary concept, to be applied with equal force to all issues in a case. If some issues involve 
scientific expertise and others do not, the agency will receive greater deference on the issues 
that do. "). 
15. See infra note 188. 
16. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 
46, 56, 57-58 (1981) ("[U]nless the ... Act requires a contrary conclusion, the Board's 
interpretation of the plain language of the ... Act must be upheld."); EPA v. National 
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) ("It is by now a commonplace [sic] that 'when 
faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the 
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.' " 
(quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965»); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 
693 F.2d 156, 166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (great deference is the "general rule"). 
17. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 60. 
18. 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 29:1, at 332. 
19. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) ("An administrative 
agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts still sit in 
review of the administrative decision and should not approach the statutory construction 
issue de novo and without regard to the administrative understanding of the statutes. "); 
Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 149 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) 
("There is, of course, no rule of administrative stare decisis. Agencies frequently adopt one 
interpretation of a statute and then, years later, adopt a different view." Courts have ap­
proved such interpretative changes so long as the new interpretation is consistent with 
congressional intent.). One commentator noted: 
[T]he adjudicative officials of administrative agencies share and respond to the 
feelings and aspirations that are reflected in the principle ofstare decisis: the urge 
for intellectual consistency in decision-making and the wish to demonstrate that 
equality of treatment is being given to all claimants and respondents .... But it 
would be grossly misleading to suggest that the common law doctrine of prece­
dent is, as in the courts, the pervasive and governing norm of administrative 
adjudication. 
H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN, & A. MURPHY, supra note 4, at ll-l2. 
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the older rule endorsed by the Supreme Court or defer to the agency 
and its new interpretative rule.20 In making their determinations, the 
lower courts must keep in mind the doctrine of stare decisis and the 
strong presumption of correctness given judicial interpretations of 
statutory language. 
Recently, in Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California 
District Council ofLaborers,21 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir­
cuit confronted such a situation. The Ninth Circuit was faced with an 
interpretative rule adopted by the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB") which stated that prehire agreements22 could not be unilat­
erally repudiated.23 By contrast, two earlier Supreme Court decisions 
held that these agreements could be unilaterally repudiated.24 In the 
earlier Supreme Court cases, the Court and the NLRB agreed on the 
particular statutory interpretation.2s Later, the NLRB announced it 
had changed its position on the statutory interpretation; its new inter­
pretative rule now contradicted the rule previously upheld by the 
Supreme Court. 26 
When confronted with these two contrasting rules, the Ninth Cir­
cuit opted to defer to the agency, thus implementing the agency's new 
interpretative rule.27 The result was a rule of law in stark contrast to 
the one previously adopted by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit 
rationalized its decision by construing the earlier Supreme Court 
precedents as simple deference to the NLRB.28 In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit ignored the strong presumption of correctness given such judi­
cial interpretations. 
This Note explores the environment which gave rise to Mesa 
Verde. Section I discusses statutory stare decisis and provides a brief 
background of the NLRB and'its relationship with the courts. Section 
20. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 428-29 (1983) ("The application of 
Supreme Court decisions to executive branch policies is virtually undisputed: if a particu­
lar policy is found unconstitutional, or contrary to the statute, that decision is binding on 
the agency. The appropriate application of circuit and district court decisions to agency 
policies is not as clear-cut. "). 
21. 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990). 
22. See infra note 73. 
23. See infra notes 80-81. 
24. Jim McNeff, Inc. V. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983); NLRB V. Local Union No. 103, 
434 U.S. 335 (1978) (commonly referred to as "Higdon"); see infra notes 80-81. 
25. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 266-71; Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351-52. 
26. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 V. 
NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 771 (3d Cir.), cerro denied, 488 U.S. 889-90 (1988). 
27. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. V. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124,1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990). 
28. Id. at 1129-31. 
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II sets out the facts of Mesa Verde and the court's reasoning. Section 
III suggests that the Supreme Court's interpretation became a part of 
the statute, due to statutory stare decisis, and as such it enjoyed a 
strong presumption of correctness. Section III then presents the tradi­
tional exceptions to statutory stare decisis to determine whether Mesa 
Verde is a justifiable departure. Finally, Section III rationalizes the 
decision under deference to agencies to determine whether the court's 
deference was appropriate. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Stare Decisis 29 
The origins of the "doctrine" of statutory stare decisis are some­
thing of a mystery.30 Several different rationales have been advanced 
for the strong presumption granted statutory precedents. The 
Supreme Court once said that a longstanding statutory interpretation 
becomes "part of the warp and woof of the legislation,"3l which only 
Congress can change.32 The statute then becomes amended to the ex­
29. For early examples of unusual stare decisis protection granted statutory 
precedents, see Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1366 n.24. 
30. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1364 ("[T]he super-strong presumption against over­
ruling statutory precedents is a very odd doctrine, if it can even be called that."). Not until 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. did the Court recognize a relaxed standard of stare 
decisis for constitutional cases. See 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938) and 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Louis Brandeis stated that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this 
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet, 285 U.S. at 4.Q6.07 (citation and 
footnote omitted). Although there was no distinction mentioned between common law and 
statutory precedents, Justice Brandeis elaborated on this point in a later opinion. In the 
later opinion, Justice Brandeis was fully persuaded of the precedent's error, but stated: 
"[i]f only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to 
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitution­
ality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so." Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (footnote omitted) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842». 
31. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450(1948); cf Douglass v. County of 
Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879) ("After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, 
the construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as 
much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and 
purposes the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a 
legislative enactment. "). 
32. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 
(1986) ("We are especially reluctant to reject this presumption in an area that has seen 
careful, intense, and sustained congressional attention. If there is to be an overruling ... , 
it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court."); Francis, 333 U.S. at 450. 
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tent of the court's decision. 33 
Another reason for supporting the strong presumption of statu­
tory precedent is founded upon legislative acquiescence.34 Congress is 
presumed to be fully cognizant of the interpretation of the statutory 
scheme.35 If Congress does not overrule the precedent, and especially 
if it reenacts the statute without changing the language at issue, courts 
presume Congress approved of the judicial interpretation.36 Any sub­
sequent change of this judicial decision should then come from the 
legislature.37 
33. Horack, supra note 7, at 250. 
34. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 
(1987); see NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985) (Con­
gress had not altered the interpretation since it was handed down eighteen years before­
hand, nor was any evidence offered regarding Congress' original intent. Meanwhile, both 
labor and management had relied on the decision. "In such circumstances we should fol­
low the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation."); Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1977); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inac­
tion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 91 (1988). 
35. Square DCa., 476 U.S. at 419; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 
837 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 
(1979) ("It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citi­
zens, know the law ...."); see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). But see 
Marshall, supra note 7, at 182-96 (criticizing theory of congressional acquiescence); Rogers, 
supra note 7, at 612 (Because legislatures are extremely busy, "[t]he issue presented by a 
court reversal of a prior statutory construction may be considered trivial or of little impor­
tance compared to the other questions confronting a legislature."). 
36. Square DCa., 476 U.S. at 419 (Congress specifically addressed this area and left 
the case at issue undisturbed; this lends "powerful support" to the case's continued viabil­
ity.); Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (reenactment is treated as ratifica­
tion of court's earlier decision); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) 
("The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, 
and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial con­
struction as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is 
the correct one."); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70-76 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dis­
senting) (failure of Congress to overrule statutory interpretation creates presumption of 
legislative approval); see Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356,357 (1953) (per 
curiam) (legislative acquiescence in precedent); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 130-32 
(1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (legislative approval presumed when Congress reenacted 
statute with Court's interpretation unchanged). But see Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119 ("It 
would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this 
Court from reexamining its own doctrines."); Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69 ("It is at best 
treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of 
law."); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) 
("Notwithstanding recent tendency, the idea cannot always be accepted that Congress, by 
remaining silent and taking no affirmative action in repudiation, gives approval to judicial 
misconstruction of its enactments. "). 
37. Horack, supra note 7, at 251-52 (The court's reversal of a previous position of an 
established rule of law "is explicitly and unquestionably the exercise of a legislative func­
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A third reason advanced for the strong presumption of correct­
ness is founded upon the belief that parties have relied upon the deci­
sion. Once the Supreme Court interprets a statute, private parties will 
conduct their affairs accordingly.38 Presumably, Congress also relies 
upon the interpretation unless it changes the statute. 39 
The final reason suggested for the presumption hinges upon the 
separation of powers between Congress and the courts.40 Under the 
Constitution, Congress has the task of creating law, while the judiciary 
is confined to interpreting the law. When the jUdiciary overrul~ a 
statutory precedent which has been "amended" to the statute, it is 
exercising the congressional power of amending or repealing the law 
without any of the procedural safeguards associated with the legisla­
ture. This judicial exercise of a legislative function is impermissible 
under the separation of powers doctrine. 
Although courts and commentators offer different reasons for the 
doctrine of the presumption of correctness afforded statutory prece­
dents, there can be no doubt as to its' existence. Thus, when a court 
encounters an issue of statutory interpretation, it should carefully ex­
amine the judicial precedent in light of the strong presumption of 
correctness. 
In addition, courts naturally look for guidance to the agency 
charged with administering the statute. In Mesa Verde, the relevant 
agency was the NLRB. Before considering the case itself, however, 
perspective can be gained by examining the NLRB's long, and some­
times stormy, relationship with the court system. 
B. Board and Court Relationship 
Congress adopted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" 
or the "Act"),41 administered by the National Labor Relations 
Board,42 against a backdrop ofjudicial insensitivity to the principles of 
tion, ... The judicial change of a legislative rule occurs without any of the safeguards 
nonnally surrounding legislative action. The change is not made by elected representa­
tives." It is not done with the usual committee meetings which allow individuals to voice 
their opinions, nor is there an opportunity for executive veto.). 
38. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382-84. 
39. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time fail­
ure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by 
Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is 
persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one."). 
40. Marshall, supra note 7, at 200-08. 
41. National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 
49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988». 
42. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 6(a), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988». 
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unionism and collective bargaining.43 Because of this, the Act makes 
limited provision for judicial review.44 
Soon' after the enactment of the statute, the Supreme Court ar­
ticulated the Act's purposes and its scope in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 45 The Court stated that the Act was 
designed to prevent obstructions to the free flow of commerce which 
result from strikes and other forms of industrial unrest.46 This was to 
be achieved by eliminating the causes of that unrest.47 The Act was 
premised on findings that strikes and industrial strife result from the 
refusal of employers to bargain collectively and the inability of individ­
ual workers to bargain successfully for improvements in their working 
conditions.48 
The Court, in Hearst Publications, stated that the Act uses broad 
language which "leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be deter­
mined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts 
rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal 
classifications."49 The Court then explained that the lower courts 
should defer to the NLRB, in appropriate situations, for the peaceful 
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person 
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) af­
fecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjust­
ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or 
otherwise .... 
29 U.S.C. § 16O(a) (1988). 
43. Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 399,401 (1988); see Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A 
Decade ofFrustration, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 327, 328 (1958); Reilly, The Legisla­
tive History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 288 (1960). 
44. Originally, the Act stated: "[t]he findings of the Board as to the facts, if sup­
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive." National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 
No. 74-198, § 100e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft­
Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 148 (1947). Currently, the law 
states: "[t]he findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by sub­
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 16O(e) (1988); see Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretation ofLabor Laws, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 577, 
595 (1939). 
45. 322 U.S. III (1944). 
46. Id. at 126. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. In 1947, Congress reduced the Act's coverage with the passage of the Taft­
Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) ~ct, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988». The preamble of this amend­
ment still refers to "industrial strife" as the principle evil to be avoided by the Act. Id. 
§ 1(b), 61 Stat. 136, 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988». Even after the Amend­
ment was passed, the limited judicial review remained. Id. § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 148 (codi­
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 16O(e) (1988». 
49. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 129. 
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settlement of employees' disputes with employers. The NLRB de­
serves this deference because of its familiarity with the circumstances 
and backgrounds of employment relationships, awareness of the abili­
ties and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective ac­
tion, and its knowledge of collective bargaining. 50 In particular, the 
Court explained exactly when it was appropriate to defer to the Board: 
Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is not the 
court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the 
Board's, when the latter have support in the record. Undoubtedly 
questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the 
first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, 
giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special 
duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the question 
is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceed­
ing in which the agency administering the statute must determine it 
initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.... [T)he Board's 
determination ... is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record" 
and a reasonable basis in law.51 
In spite of this recommended deference, courts, especially the 
courts of appeals,52 have been quick to overrule the Board's deci­
sions.53 The courts of appeals' rejections of Board decisions have been 
50. Id. at 129-30. 
51. Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted). For similar language, see, e.g., Bayside Enters., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1977); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 
260-67 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235-37 (1963); NLRB v. Truck 
Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 
344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 
(2d Cir. 1968). 
52. For additional discussion of the relationship between agencies and the courts, see 
generally Dotson & Williamson, NLRB v. The Courts: The Need for an Acquiescence Policy 
at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 739 (1987); Kaiker, Nonacquiescence by the 
NLRB: Combat Versus Collabaration, 3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987); Saunders, Agency Interpre­
tations and Judicial Review: A Search for Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given 
Agency Statutory Constructions, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 769 (1988); Zimmerman & Dunn, Rela­
tions Between the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A Tale of Acrimony and Accommo­
dation, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4 (1982); Comment, "Respectful Disagreement": 
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals 
Precedents, 18 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463 (1985). 
53. One commentator compared the results of two studies on the relationship be­
tween the Supreme Court and the NLRB. The studies were conducted twenty years apart 
and compared in the latter article. In both studies, he concluded: "(I) that the Supreme 
Court basically approves of the Board's concept of the meaning of the labor statute and (2) 
that a major portion of the Supreme Court's role in labor policy has been to protect the 
Board from the circuit courts." Evans, "Caesar" Revisited: The NLRB and the Supreme 
Court, 36 LAB. L.J. 789, 789 (1985). Contra Winter, Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions: 
The Labar Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. Cr. REV. 53,72 ("The Supreme Court has in 
fact shown little deference to Board discretion . . . . And more frequently than not, the 
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so constant that the Board adopted the following policy of nonacquies­
cence:S4 "It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to deter­
mine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a circuit court of 
appeals or whether, with due deference to the court's opinion, to ad­
here to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United 
States has ruled otherwise."" 
The result of the Board's policy of nonacquiescence is a bifur­
cated system in which litigants can avoid the Board's orders by simply 
litigating to the appellate level. 56 The effect of the Board's policy is to 
protract litigation, establish a two-tier system of labor law within the 
same jurisdiction, encourage disrespect for Board orders, and antago­
nize the courts. S7 This two-tier system places an undue burden on 
those litigants who lack the necessary resources to pursue matters to 
the court of appeals leveI.S8 
Some courts expressly reject the Board's policy of nonacquies­
cence: "Congress has not given to the NLRB the power or authority 
Court has employed a broad scope of review that has permitted it to substitute its own 
judgment. "). 
54. There are two types of nonacquiescence: intracircuit and intercircuit. Intracir­
cuit nonacquiescence results when an agency fails to defer to precedent within a given 
circuit. Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 
582, 583 (1985). "Intercircuit nonacquiescence is consistent with the prevailing 'law of the 
circuit' doctrine, under which decisions of a court of appeals are the law of that circuit but 
do not bind courts in other circuits." Kafker, supra note 52, at 138 (quoting Note, Admin­
istrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 582, 583 (1985». 
When discussing agency nonacquiescence, one commentator noted: 
[T]he agencies enforce the statutory interpretations of the lower federal courts 
only with respect to the particular litigants before the courts. . . . Even when 
presented with the same questions of law, agencies continue to make determina­
tions based upon their own prior administrative policies and statutory interpreta­
tions, which the courts have previously rejected. 
Note, Denying the Precedential Effect ofFederal Circuit Court Decisions: Nonacquiescence 
by Administrative Agencies, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 151, 152 (1985) (footnote omitted». 
The Board premises nonacquiescence on the fact that each court of appeals develops 
its own "law of the circuit"; decisions of other courts of appeals are persuasive but not 
binding authority. See City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d lOW, 1014 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969) ("Decisions of district courts and other courts of appeals are, of course, not 
binding on us and are looked to only for their persuasive effect. If they fail to persuade by 
the use of sound and logical reasoning, they will not be followed, no matter how great their 
number."). 
55. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforcement de­
nied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); see Inter-Island Resorts, 
Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 n.12 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963), 
enforced in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964). 
56. Dotson & Williamson, supra note 52, at 745. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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to disagree, respectfully or otherwise, with decisions of th[e] COurt."S9 
However, another court stated, "[w]e assume without deciding that 
the [agency] is free to decline to follow decisions of the courts of ap­
peals with which it disagrees, even in cases arising in those circuits."60 
The judicial system tolerates the Board's policy of nonacquies­
cence. Therefore, uniformity of law r~ults only when the Supreme 
Court rules on the issue.61 If, however, the Supreme Court rules to 
support the Board's interpretation, and· the Board subsequently 
changes its interpretation, the lower courts are faced with a conflict. 
They must then decide whether to follow the decision of the Supreme 
Court under the doctrine of stare decisis, or whether to defer to the 
Board as the Supreme Court did. 
Precisely this dilemma arose in the Ninth Circuit in the Mesa 
Verde case.62 The Ninth Circuit was faced with two earlier Supreme 
Court rulings which upheld a particular NLRB interpretative rule. 
The problem, however, was that both Supreme Court decisions argua­
bly could be interpreted either as the Supreme Court articulating its 
own rule (which happened to be in agreement with that of the NLRB) 
or as the Supreme Court deferring completely to the NLRB. Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit ha4 to determine whether, as a lower court, it could 
disagree with the Supreme Court in light of the doctrine of statutory 
stare decisis. 
59. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he Board 
is not a court nor is it equal to this court in matters of statutory interpretation. Thus, a 
disagreement by the NLRB with a decision of this court is simply an academic exercise that 
possesses no authoritative effect."); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal 
Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("[Tlhe courts are the final authorities on 
issues of statutory construction, and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their 
affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate 
or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.' " (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (citation omitted»). 
60. S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1278 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 
224, 229-30 (2d Cir.) (reversing NLRB order and declining to remand case to Board, in 
part because of Board's express refusal to follow Second Circuit precedent), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 975 (1980). 
61. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforcement de­
nied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1959), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 
N.L.R.B. 1476, 1477 (1950) ("With due respect for the opinion of the [c]ourt ... , the 
Board is constrained to adhere to the Board's original view until the Supreme Court of the 
United States has had an opportunity to pass on the question."). 
62. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990). 
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II. MESA VERDE CONSTRUCTION CO. V. NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 

DISTRICT COUNCIL OF LABORERS 63 

In 1980, Mesa Verde, a general contractor, entered into agree­
ments with both the laborers' union and the carpenters' union. These 
agreements were entered into despite the fact that neither union had 
obtained majority status. The first agreement with the Laborers was 
reached on June 26, 1980, and was to remain in effect until June 15, 
1983.64 Thereafter, the agreement would remain in effect from year to 
year, absent written notice by either party. Under the contract, Mesa 
Verde agreed to comply with all wages, hours, and working conditions 
which were set forth in the Laborers' Master Agreement for Northern 
California.6s The master agreement between the Laborers, the Associ­
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. and Bay Counties Gen­
eral Contractors Association, set wage rates for various jobs and 
provided for arbitration in certain situations regarding "any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement."66 On 
November 17, 1982, Mesa Verde and the Laborers agreed to extend 
their contract to June 15, 1986. 
Mesa Verde and the Carpenters reached their first agreement in 
August, 1979.67 Mesa Verde accepted the Carpenters' Master Agree­
ment for Northern California, an agreement between the Carpenters, 
the Building Industry Association of Northern California, the Califor­
nia Contractors Council, Inc. and the Millwright Employers Associa­
tion. The agreement set various rates and provided for arbitration of 
"[a]ny dispute concerning the relationship of the parties, [and] any 
application or interpretation of this [a]greement."68 Later, Mesa 
Verde and the Carpenters extended the master agreement to June 15, 
1986, with certain modifications.69 
In May, 1984, with members of both unions working on a project 
in Hercules, California, Mesa Verde notified both unions by mail of its 
intent to abrogate the agreements.70 Shortly thereafter, Mesa Verde 
began another job in Orland, California, employing only non-union 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1126. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (quoting the parties' contract). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (quoting the parties' contract). 
69. Id. These modifications included limited wage increases and provided more flexi­
ble working conditions for Mesa Verde. Id. 
70. Id. 
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workers.71 This would constitute a violation of the collective bargain­
ing agreements, should they still be in effect. Both unions filed notices 
of grievance and requested arbitration concerning the contractual obli­
gations for the Orland project. 
Eventually, the district court granted Mesa Verde summary judg­
ment against both unions.72 The court held that these collective bar­
gaining agreements were construction industry prehire agreements73 
under 29 U.S.C. § 15874 (better known as section 8(f) of the 
NLRA).7S These prehire agreements were effectively repudiated by 
the letters sent by Mesa Verde to each of the unions.76 
71. 	 Id. 
72. Id. at 1127; see Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Labor­
ers, 598 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 1984),off'd, 895 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1989). 
73. A prehire agreement is the first step taken between an employer and a union. It 
contemplates that further action will be taken to develop a full bargaining relationship. 
The employer's obligation to fulfill the agreement is contingent upon the union attaining 
. majority status. 	Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971). Congress author­
ized these agreements between the employer and the union even though the union did not 
maintain a majority status. This authorization was given based on the "uniquely tempo­
rary, transitory, and sometimes seasonal nature of much of the employment in the con­
struction industry." Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266 (1983). 
74. 	 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988) provides: 
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction indus­
try to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their em­
ployment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor 
organization of which building and construction employees are members (not es­
tablished, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this 
section as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor 
organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this 
title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a 
condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the sev­
enth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of the 
agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to 
notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such em­
ployer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified appli­
cants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or 
experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities 
for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry 
or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection 
shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Provided fur­
ther, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) ofthis subsec­
tion, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of 
this title. 
Id. 
75. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990). 
76. Id. The district court also denied the Laborers' motion to vacate and did not 
grant the Laborers additional discovery to detemtine the existence of a core group of em­
ployees. Id. 
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Initially, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, in accordance with Supreme 
Court precedent.77 On rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit was faced 
with a peculiar situation. First, the Ninth Circuit noted that in a re­
cent case in the Third Circuit, International Association of Bridge. 
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers. Local 3 v. NLRB 
("Deklewa"),78 the Board had changed its interpretative rule.79 This 
new administrative rule was now contrary to the one upheld in two 
Supreme Court precedents: NLRB v. Local Union No. 103 ("Hig­
don")80 and Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd. 8l Both precedents were in ac­
cord with the Board's older rule that prehire agreements could be 
77. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 832 F.2d 
1164 (9th Cir. 1981). The two Supreme Court precedents are Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 
461 U.S. 260, 271 (1983) ("A § 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the 
union establishes majority status.") and NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 341 
(1978) ("Higdon") (A prehire agreement is voidable unless and until the union actually 
represents a majority of the employees.). See infra notes 80-81. 
78. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) [hereinafter Deklewa, so 
named for the company John Deklewa & Sons involved in the suit]. Deklewa was decided 
after the Ninth Circuit's panel decision and before the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision. 
79. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1128. 
80. 434 U.S. 335 (1978) ("Higdon," so called for the Higdon Construction Co. in­
volved in the suit). Higdon Construction Co. and Local 103 of the International Associa­
tion of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (Local 103) entered into 
a prehire agreement which obliged Higdon to abide by the terms of the multiemployer 
understanding between Local 103 and the Tri-State Iron Workers Employers Association, 
Inc. Id. at 339. At the same time, Higdon Contracting Co. was formed expressly to carry 
on work with nonunion labor. Local 103 never represented a majority of the employees, 
nor did it petition for a representation election to determine the preference of the employ­
ees. Id. Regardless, Local 103 picketed two projects undertaken by Higdon Contracting 
Co. Local 103 carried signs which read: "Higdon Construction Company is in violation of 
the agreement of the Iron Workers Local Number 103." Id. Because of the picketing, 
Higdon filed a charge with the Regional Director of the Board, which alleged that Local 
103's picketing constituted an unfair labor practice which was forbidden by section 8(b)(7) 
of the NLRA. Id. 
Initially, the administrative law judge determined that Higdon Contracting Co. and 
Higdon Construction Co. were legally indistinct for purposes of the proceeding. Id. The 
judge also decided that there was no unfair labor practice because Higdon had entered into 
a lawful section 8(f) prehire contract with Local 103 in which it promised to abide by the 
multiemployer standard. Id. The purpose of the picketing was to obtain compliance with 
an existing contract, not for the forbidden purpose of obtaining recognition as the bargain­
ing representative. Id. 
On appeal, the issue in Higdon was whether unions could picket to enforce prehire 
agreements, even though the union had not obtained majority status. Id. at 341. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the Board and declared that under section 8(f) of the NLRA a 
prehire agreement was voidable. unless and until a union attains majority status. Id. 
After determining that the agreement was voidable, the Supreme Court held that there 
could be no picketing. Id. at 341-52. The Court reasoned that under section 8(f), a prehire 
agreement does not entitle a minority union to be treated as the majority representative of 
the employees until and unless it attains majority support in the relevant unit. Id. at 346­
52. Until then, the prehire agreement is voidable and does not have the same stature as a 
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repudiated unilaterally. The Board's new interpretative rule declared 
collective bargaining contract entered into with a union which actually represents a major­
ity of the employees and recognized as such by the employer. Id. 
The Court also noted that picketing by a minority union to enforce a prehire agree­
ment that the employer refuses to honor gives the union the practical effect of attaining 
recognition as the bargaining representative with majority support among the employees. 
Id. Acting as the bargaining representative without having majority support is a violation 
of section 8(bX7)(C) of the NLRA. Id. at 341. This is consistent with the statutory policy 
that a union should not purport to act as the collective-bargaining agent for all unit em­
ployees, nor should it be recognized as the bargaining agent, unless it is indeed the voice of 
the majority of the employees in the unit. Id. 
29 U.S.C. § IS8(bX7)(C), which describes labor practices regarding picketing, 
provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents­
(7) to picket ... any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring 
an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa­
tive of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to 
accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representa­
tive, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of 
such employees: 
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under 
section IS9(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period oftime not 
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, 
That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without 
regard to the provisions of section IS9(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a 
showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct 
an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify 
the results thereof .... 
29 U.S.C. § IS8(bX7XC) (1988). 
81. 461 U.S. 260 (1983). The Supreme Court again expanded the obligations arising 
under prehire agreements in McNeff. In McNeff, the petitioner was a subcontractor. [d. at 
262. The general contractor entered into a master agreement with the union. Id. This 
contract provided that work on the jobsite would be performed only by subcontractors who 
had signed a labor agreement with the union. [d. When the petitioner began work at the 
jobsite, he had not signed the labor agreement with the union, nor did he employ any union 
workers. [d. at 263. 
When the petitioner was informed that in order to remain on the jobsite he would have 
to sign the master agreement, he initially refused but later agreed to sign it. Id. The master 
agreement required the petitioner to make monthly contributions to a trust fund. Id. For 
six months, the petitioner submitted the required reports but made no contributions. Id. at 
263-64. After the petitioner delayed the respondents' audits as long as he could, the re­
spondents finally determined that petitioner owed in excess of five thousand dollars to the 
trust fund. Id. at 264. 
The issue in McNeff was whether monetary obligations that accrued under a prehire 
agreement could be enforced, prior to the repudiation of the agreement, when there was no 
proof that the union represented a majority of the employees. [d. at 262. 
The Supreme Court held that a prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the 
union establishes majority status. [d. at 271. Even though majority status was not at­
tained, the monetary obligations assumed by an employer under a prehire contract could be 
recovered by a union prior to the repudiation of the contract. [d. at 271-72. 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that Congress determined that prehire con­
tracts should be lawful in order to meet the problems which are unique to the construction 
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that prehire agreements were not voidable simply because the union 
had not obtained majority status. The question now before the Ninth 
Circuit was whether it could choose to implement the new agency rule 
despite Supreme Court precedent. 
At first glance, it appeared as though the Ninth Circuit could not 
adopt the Board's new rule because it would be contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent.82 After analyzing both Higdon and McNeff, how­
ever, the Ninth Circuit declared that "[i]n neither case . . . did the 
Supreme Court definitively construe [section] 8(f). Rather, the Court 
found that the Board's interpretation of [section] 8(f) was an accepta­
ble interpretation of the statute and that it reasonably implemented 
the purposes of the Act. The Court, therefore, deferred to the 
NLRB's interpretation of [section] 8(f)."83 
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to point out specific language 
in both Higdon and McNeff to support its holding that the Supreme 
Court only deferred to the NLRB.84 The Ninth Circuit first pointed 
to the part of the Higdon opinion which stated that "the function of 
striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a diffi­
cult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed pri­
marily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited 
judicial review."8s The court noted that the Higdon Court "concluded 
that the Board's construction of the Act, although perhaps not the 
only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language 
and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statu­
tory sections."86 The Mesa Verde court then decided that the Higdon 
Court did not "independently construe the reach and scope of section 
8(f). Rather, the [Higdon] Court recognized the expertise and experi­
ence of the Board in effectuating national labor policy as mandated by 
Congress and limited its review to whether the Board's interpretation 
of [section] 8(f) was reasonable."81 
industry. Id. at 271. Even though a prehire agreement has a limited binding effect, logic 
and equity support that a party to such an agreement can reap benefits only by paying the 
bargained-for consideration. Id. Legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend 
for employers to obtain the benefits of stable labor costs and labor peace without providing 
some consideration. See id. 
82. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990); see supra notes 80­
81. 
83. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1129. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers 
Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957»). 
86. Id. at 1129 (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341). 
87. Id. at 1129. 
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The Mesa Verde court then shifted its analysis to McNeff. The 
Ninth Circuit held, just as in Higdon, that the McNeff Court did not 
provide an independent construction of section 8(f).88 Rather, the 
McNeff Court relied on the Higdon Court's affirmance of the Board's 
interpretation of section 8(f).89 The Ninth Circuit pointed to specific 
language in the McNeff opinion where that Court noted that in Hig­
don it was approving the Board's interpretative rule.90 The Mesa 
Verde court then pointed to language in both Higdon and McNeff 
which expressly recognized that an administrative agency is allowed to 
change its interpretative rules.91 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that 
neither Higdon nor McNeff precluded it from adopting the Board's 
new interpretative rule as expressed in Deklewa.92 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that in both Higdon and McNeff, "the Supreme Court 
looked to the Board's interpretation, found it reasonable and consis­
tent with the NLRA, and deferred to the Board's interpretation."93 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided that it also could defer to the 
Board, if the agency's interpretation met the standard established by 
the Supreme Court. The next issue, then, was whether the new inter­
pretation offered by the Board was a reasonable and tenable construc­
tion of section 8(f).94 To determine the answer, the Mesa Verde court 
first examined the legislative history. The court noted that when Con­
gress passed section 8(f), it recognized the unique relationship among 
the parties in the construction industry and the widespread use of 
these prehire agreements.9S 
Congress recognized the special needs of the building and con­
struction industry that arise due to the "occasional nature" of the em­
ployment.96 This makes the construction industry different from other 
industries, such as manufacturing.97 A construction worker will typi­
88. Id. 
89. Id. (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1983». 
90. Id. at 1129-31 (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 269). 
91. Id. at 1130 (citing Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978». 
92. Id. at 1130. See generally International Association ofBridge, Structural & Orna­
mental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 
(1988) ("Deklewa"); supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1130-31. 
95. Id. at 1131. For legislative history, see generally S. REp. No. 187, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. 27-29, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2318,2344-45, and 
in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLO­
SURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 423-25 (1959). 
96. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1131. 
97. Id. 
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cally work for several employers.98 Frequently, jobs are of short dura­
tion, depending upon the particular stage of the construction.99 An 
employer must know his labor cost before submitting his bid. An em­
ployer must also have an available supply of skilled craftsmen for 
quick referral. loo Enactment of section 8(f) recognized the industry­
wide use of these prehire agreements which are designed to meet these 
needs. 101 
The Mesa Verde court reasoned that allowing unilateral repudia­
tion of these collective bargaining agreements did not advance the con­
gressional intent. 1m To allow parties to make prehire agreements, but 
to allow them to be unilaterally repudiated would be an "exercise in 
futility."t03 The Ninth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the legisla­
tive intent more strongly supported the Deklewa nonrepudiation 
rule. 104 
The Mesa Verde court then examined the two most important 
interests at issue controlling whether prehire agreements should be 
voidable at will.IOS First, the NLRA106 provides employees with free­
dom of choice and majority rule in their selection of representatives. 107 
Second, the structure of the collective bargaining process and various 
provisions of the Act, like the "contract bar,"108 guarantee labor rela­
tions stability to both employers and employees. 109 The Mesa Verde 
court held that the old voidability rule provided more support for em­






103. Id. (quoting Local Union No. ISO v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. Cit. 
1973». 
104. Id. at 1131. 
105. Id. 
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1988) (National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 9). 
107. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1131-32. 
108. "The 'contract bar' provides that once a certification election is held within an 
appropriate bargaining unit, no other election may be held for twelve months." Id. at 1132 
n.6. The contract bar does not apply to section 8(f) agreements. Id. at 1132. 
109. Id. at 1131-32. 
110. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain­
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall 
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a 
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their 
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the 
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to a union that had not demonstrated majority support. I II On the 
other hand, the Board's new rule announced in Deklewa better served 
the interest in labor relations stability. 112 
Appellee and amici argued that by retaining the power to unilat­
erally repudiate prehire agreements, employers were able to protect 
their employees' "free choice" rights. l13 The Mesa Verde court was 
not convinced. It stated that the employer's decision to repudiate a 
prehire agreement is more likely to be based on the employer's eco­
nomic considerations, rather than the employee's choice of maintain­
ing the status quO. 114 The Mesa Verde court concludedliS that 
Deklewa should be adopted in the Ninth Circuit, and it remanded to 
the district court for a determination of whether Deklewa should be 
applied retroactively. I 16 
Three separate dissenting opinions were written in the Mesa 
Verde cases. Judge Wallace noted that the question was "close" re­
garding the Supreme Court's conduct in McNeff, but in the end, he 
was persuaded that the Supreme Court conclusively interpreted sec­
tion 8(f), rather than merely deciding that the NLRB's interpretation 
was permissible. ll7 Thus, as a lower federal court, the Ninth Circuit 
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the 
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided 
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be pres­
ent at such adjustment. 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). 
Ill. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1132. Only limited section 9(a) status is conferred on 
unions which enter prehire agreements under section 8(f). Id. at 1132 n.7. 
112. Id. at 1132. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. In addition, the court noted that the Deklewa rule eliminated the problems 
arising under the conversion doctrine. Id. at 1133. Under the conversion doctrine, a sec­
tion 8(f) relationship may convert to section 9(a) status. The time of conversion may occur 
anytime after the signing of the prehire agreement. Id. Conversion requires a showing of 
majority support during a relevant period among an appropriate unit of employees. Id. at 
1133-34. Because of the new rule, both parties will know their rights and obligations at all 
stages of the bargaining relationship. Id. Both parties will be required to comply with the 
agreement, absent a Board-conducted election to reject or change a bargaining representa­
tive. Id. at 1134. . 
115. The court also addressed the issue of the "rule" of Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 
703 F.ld 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1983). Royal held that a panel of the Ninth Circuit could not 
adopt a Board decision which conflicted with circuit precedent. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 
1134. The Mesa Verde court circumvented this potential problem by holding that if prior 
decisions of the Ninth Circuit constituted only deferential review of NLRB interpretations 
of Jabor law, and did not decide that a particular interpretation of a statute was the only 
reasonable interpretation, then subsequent panels of the Ninth Circuit are free to adopt new 
and reasonable NLRB decisions without the requirement of en banc review. Id. at 1134-35. 
116. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136-37. 
117. Id. at 1137 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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was bound to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation. 118 
Judge Hug's dissent argued that the inquiry was one of pure stat­
utory interpretation concerning how Congress intended prehire agree­
ments to operate. 119 According to Judge Hug, the Supreme Court 
settled this question after examining the statutory language, the legis­
lative history, and the NLRB's interpretative rule,120 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court's interpretation "must stand until it is overruled by 
the Supreme Court or until Congress amends the statute."121 Judge 
Hug insisted that the Supreme Court did interpret the statute in both 
Higdon and McNeff, even though the Supreme Court gave deference 
to the Board's interpretation,122 "The [Supreme] Court did not ... 
decide only that the Board's interpretation was a reasonable construc­
tion of the Act .... Instead-after giving heightened consideration to 
the Board's arguments-the [Supreme] Court passed judgment upon 
the meaning of section 8(f) and such judicial interpretation is binding 
under our principle of stare decisis."123 
In the final dissent, Judge Kozinski interpreted the Mesa Verde 
court's majority opinion to mean that if a federal court relies on an 
agency interpretation of a statute, then the court's construction is 
binding only until the agency adopts a new interpretation.124 "At that 
point the court, or a higher court, or a lower court, may-nay, must­
follow the agency's new interpretation unless that interpretation is un­
reasonable."12s This deference to an agency's interpretation signifi­
cantly shifts power from the jUdiciary to the executive branch. Now, 
under the majority's new decision, judges do not decide what the law 
is, but only if the agency's interpretation of the law is reasonable. 126 
Judge Kozinski continued his dissent with a comparison of the 
roles of courts and agencies. He noted that courts and agencies are 
both institutionally and functionally different. Judicial decision mak­
ing is founded on constitutional safeguards designed to protect it from 
the political manipulation which permeates the other two branches of 
government. 127 When courts interpret statutes, they are bound to "ap­
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1137-38 (Hug, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 1138. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1138-39. 
123. Id. at 1138. 
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ply the meaning endowed them by Congress and the President."128 
There is but one true meaning behind a statute, and the courts must 
find it. 129 Agencies, on the other hand, read policy content into stat­
utes, or interpret them to foster a particular political viewpoint. 130 
Judge Kozinski continued, "murisprudentially, I am troubled by 
the majority's implicit holding that the meaning of a statute can 
change in an instant simply because an administrative agency has said 
SO."131 "[S]tatutes have no fixed meaning, that in passing laws[,] Con­
gress approves a range of . . . interpretations, each as good as the 
next."132 This presents a practical problem with the majority's deci­
sion: many laws which have been interpreted conclusively by the 
court will become uncertain once the agency changes its interpretative 
rule. Because of these problems, the stability necessary for case law 
will not be found within the agency, but can only be found in the 
judiciary.133 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Stare Decisis 
Judge Kozinski's concerns are well-founded. The majority, how­
ever, seemed little troubled by the stare decisis concerns raised by the 
dissent. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, inferior courts must abide 
by or adhere to cases decided by superior courts within the same juris­
diction. 134 Assuming that the rule established by Supreme Court pre­
cedent was that prehire agreements could be unilaterally 
repudiated, l3S the Mesa Verde court did not follow binding precedent. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1146-47. 
131. Id. at 1147. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1146-47. 
134. See Kelman, The Force ofPrecedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 3, 
4 (1967) ("The doctrine can be stated simply: there is an absolute duty to apply the law as 
last pronounced by superior judicial authority."); Pound, supra note I, at 6 (Superior court 
decisions bind all inferior courts in that jurisdiction.); see supra notes 1-4 and accompany­
ing text. 
135. Many commentators have discussed various methods that should be considered 
when trying to determine exactly what the holding is and the inherent ambiguities involved 
with each method. See e.g., Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 277, 359 (1985) (criticizing the view of using material facts, because then one is 
forced to determine what the material facts are); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 
A.B.A. J. 71, 72-73 (1928) (holding could be limited to what the court did on the facts); 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987) ("In order to assess what is a prece­
dent for what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant similarities between 
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Not only did the Mesa Verde court dismiss the stare decisis issue 
rather quickly, it did not even discuss stare decisis in the special case 
of statutory interpretation. Courts, including the Supreme Court, 136 
and commentators agree that there is a strong presumption of correct­
ness given to a judicial interpretation of a statute. 137 The Supreme 
Court, for instance, recently stated, "[c ]onsiderations of stare decisis 
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation ...."138 
Because this strong presumption is recognized' by courts and 
commentators alike, only the most unusual circumstance should jus­
tify a departure from it. Traditionally, there are three exceptions 
which would warrant a deviation from statutory stare decisis. The 
first exception is based upon the possibility that the court's initial con­
sideration of the issue was not thorough. 139 The second exception fo­
cuses on the idea that the statute is very general; thus, Congress must 
have left development of the statutory scheme to the COurtS. I40 The 
last exception proposes that when precedent has not generated exten­
sive public and private reliance, it would not be harmful to deviate 
from the precedent. 141 The question therefore becomes, can Mesa 
the two events. In turn, we must extract this determination from some other organizing 
standard specifying which similarities are important and which we can safely ignore."). 
136. For a recent Supreme Court decision discussing statutory stare decisis, see Pat­
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989). 
137. Courts and commentators suggest four reasons for the doctrine. First, some 
suggest that a longstanding statutory interpretation becomes a part of the law and as such 
only Congress can change it. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. A second 
reason is based upon legislative acquiescence. That is, if Congress does not overrule the 
precedent, and especially if it reenacts the statute without changing the language at issue, 
then courts presume that Congress approves of the judicial interpretation. See supra notes 
34-37 and accompanying text. The third reason is based upon the presumption that parties 
have relied upon the decision and have conducted their affairs accordingly. See supra notes 
38-39 and accompanying text. The final rationale rests upon a separation of powers argu­
ment. Congress is given the task of creating and amending the law, while the judiciary is 
confined to interpreting it. If the judiciary changes a rule which has been "amended" to the 
statute, then it is exercising a legislative function-for only Congress can amend or repeal a 
statute. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
138. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370 (emphasis added). The exact degree of deference 
to be given to statutory precedents is a subject of some debate. One commentator advo­
cates an absolute rule-that only Congress may change a judicial statutory interpretation. 
Marshall, supra note 7, at 183. Another commentator, however, has suggested abandoning 
the super-strong presumption of correctness in favor of an "evolutive" approach. Eskridge, 
supra note 4, at 1363. 
139. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1369-84; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
220-21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (suggesting a 
significant exception to the strong presumption of correctness when the statutory precedent 
is procedurally flawed due to, for example, poor briefing or inadequate deliberation). 
140. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1369-84. 
141. Id. 
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Verde be explained by one of these exceptions? 
1. 	 Thoroughness of the Supreme Court's Investigation of 
Congressional Intent in Precedent 
First, the two precedents, NLRB v. Local Union No. 103 ("Hig­
don")142 and Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,143 must be examined to deter­
mine how thoroughly the Supreme Court investigated the issue of 
Congress' intent to allow unilateral repudiation of prehire agreements. 
In Higdon, the Court stated that "[t]he Board and the Court of Ap­
peals ... differ principally on the legal questions of how § 8(f) is to be 
construed and of what consequences the execution of a prehire agree­
ment has on the enforcement of other sections of the Act ...." 144 The 
Supreme Court concluded that the "Board's construction of the Act, 
although perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of 
the statutory language and a reasonable implementation of the pur­
poses of the relevant statutory sections."14s 
The Board's view was that picketing to enforce a prehire agree­
ment had the impermissible effect of requiring recognition of the labor 
union as the employees' bargaining representative, when in fact the 
union did not represent a majority of the employees. l46 The Court 
commented that "[t]he Board's position is rooted in the generally pre­
vailing statutory policy that a union should not purport to act as the 
collective-bargaining agent for all unit employees, and may not be rec­
ognized as such, unless it is the voice of the majority of the employees 
in the unit."147 The Court acknowledged that in the past, it had held 
that "both [the] union and [the] employer commit unfair practices 
when they sign a collective-bargaining agreement recognizing the 
union as the exclusive bargaining representative when in fact only a 
minority of the employees have authorized the union to represent their 
interests."148 However, the Court explained, "[s]ection 8(f) is an ex­
ception to this rule."149 When the employer is in the construction in­
dustry, section 8(f) legitimizes the execution of a prehire agreement 
with a minority union, an act which is normally an unfair practice by 
both employer and union.1so 
142. 434 U.S. 335 (1978); see supra note 80. 
143. 461 U.S. 260 (1983); see supra note 81. 
144. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 341-44. 
147. Id. at 344. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 345. 
150. Id. 
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The Higdon Court next examined the legislative history of section 
8(f). The Court determined that the motivating factor behind section 
8(f) was an awareness of the unique situation in the construction in­
dustry.lsi Congress determined that two particular reasons justified 
the use of prehire agreements with unions that did not represent a 
majority of the employees. ls2 The first reason was that it was "neces­
sary for the employer to know his labor costs before making the esti­
mate upon which his bid [would] be based."ls3 The second reason was 
that "the employer must be able to have available a supply of skilled 
craftsmen ready for quick referral."IS4 
Next, the Court noted: 
The Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case 
represents a defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to 
considerable deference. Courts may prefer a different application of 
the relevant sections, but "[t]he function of striking that balance to 
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate re­
sponsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review." 
Of course, "recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administra­
tive power . . . obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the 
Board's actions." But we cannot say that the Board has here 
"[moved] into a new area of regulation which Congress [has] not 
committed to it."ISS 
The union then tried to persuade the Court that the Board's stat­
utory interpretation deserved little or no deference because the Board 
had been inconsistent in its application. ls6 The Court quickly dis­
missed the argument by simply distinguishing the cases relied upon by 
the union. I S7 Nevertheless, even if the union were correct and the 
151. Id. at 348. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2442, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 759, 777 
(1959». 
154. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2442, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 759, 777 
(1959». 
155. Id. at 350 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 
96 (1957); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960». 
156. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350. 
157. Id. at 350-51. The Union suggested that R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 
693 (1971), was inconsistent with Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963). 
The Court noted that the Oilfield Maintenance decision did not make it clear whether the 
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Board had been inconsistent in its application, that may not have mat­
tered to the Court. The Court stated: "[a]n administrative agency is 
not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts 
still sit in review of the administrative decision and should not ap­
proach the statutory construction issue de novo and without regard to 
the administrative understanding of the statutes."158 
Next, the union argued that "the Board's position permitting an 
employer to repudiate a prehire agreement until the union attains ma­
jority support renders the contract for all practical purposes unen­
forceable . . . ."159 Similarly, the Court quickly dismissed this 
argument by distinguishing the case relied upon by the union to sup­
port the enforceability of prehire agreements. 1OO It did not even ad­
dress the fact that these agreements may actually be rendered 
unenforceable due to unilateral repudiation. 
Justice Stewart wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined in 
his dissent by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. The dissent did not 
think that any section of the Act "rendered illegal the union's peaceful 
primary picket protesting Higdon's unilateral and total breach of its 
prehire agreement ...."161 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent 
argued: 
When an employer in the construction industry does choose to enter 
a § 8(f) prehire agreement, there is nothing in the provisions or pol­
icies of national labor law that allows the employer, or the Board, to 
dismiss the agreement as a nullity. Yet in this case the Court holds 
that both the Board and the employer may do precisely that. 162 
union involved in that case had ever attained majority status. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350-51. 
In addition, the Court noted that the Oilfield Maintenance case was distinguished by the 
Board in Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 n.5, "as being 'primarily con­
cerned' with 'the right of a successor-employer to disavow contracts made by a predecessor 
with five different unions and [its ability to] substitute the terms of a contract it had with 
another union.''' Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351 (quoting Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 701 n.5). 
158. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. The Union argued that the Board's position was contrary to the Supreme 
Court~s decision in Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). 
Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351. The Higdon Court described the Retail Clerks opinion as recog­
nizing that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act conferred jurisdiction on 
federal courts to consider suits on contracts between an employer and a minority union, as 
well as those with majority-designated collective-bargaining agents. Id. at 351. This cate­
gory also included section 8(f) contracts. Therefore, the Higdon Court limited Retail 
Clerks to a decision on a jurisdictional issue. Simply because a court has jurisdiction to 
entertain a suit on a particular contract does not render the contract enforceable. Id. at 
351-52. 
161. Id. at 355 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
162. Id. at 353. 
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The next case in which the Court had an opportunity to examine· 
the issue of the legislative intent behind prehire agreements was Jim 
McNeff, Inc. v. Todd. 163 After discussing and analyzing the reasons 
behind Congress' enactment of the statute, the Court reassessed its 
Higdon opinion. l64 The Court stated: 
We first addressed the enforceability of a § 8(f) prehire agree­
ment in Higdon. . .. In Higdon, we affirmed the Board's view that a 
prehire agreement does not make a union the "representative of [an 
employer's] employees" .... 
In upholding the Board's view that a union commits an unfair 
labor practice by picketing to enforce a prehire agreement before it 
has attained majority status, we noted in Higdon that this view pro­
tects [the] interests that Congress intended to uphold when it en­
acted § 8(f).... 
. . . [O]ur decision in Higdon promotes Congress' "intention 
... that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily ...." 
In accord with this intention, we approved the Board's conclusion 
that a "prehire agreement is voidable" "until and unless [the union] 
attains majority support in the relevant unit ...." 
The concerns with the § 7 rights of employees to select their 
own bargaining representative and our fidelity to Congress' intent 
that prehire agreements be voluntary-and voidable-that led to 
our decision in Higdon are not present in [McNeff) . ...16S 
The McNeff Court also spoke of a party's "undoubted right to 
repudiate a prehire agreement."l66 Thus, from this reading of the 
McNeff opinion, one is led to believe that the Court considers itself to 
have done an independent analysis of the issue in Higdon and agreed 
with the Board only as an afterthought. 167 It seems as though the 
163. 461 U.S. 260 (1983); see supra note 81. 
164. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 265-67. 
165. Id. at 266-69 (citations omitted). McNeff differed from Higdon because McNeff 
involved the monetary obligations incurred by an employer after he signed a section 8(f) 
contract, while Higdon involved picketing to enforce the contract. These monetary obliga­
tions do not "impair the right of the employees to select their own bargaining agent. Un­
like the situation in Higdon, enforcement of accrued obligations in a § 301 suit does not 
mean that the union represents a majority of the employer's employees." McNeff, 461 U.S. 
at 269. 
166. Id. at 270. 
167. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting) ("I am persuaded that the 
Supreme Court conclusively and authoritatively interpreted section 8(f), rather than 
merely deciding that the NLRB's interpretation was permissible."), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 
209 (1990); id. at 1138 (Hug, J., dissenting) ("I part company from the majority because I 
believe the Supreme Court did definitively construe section 8(f) in both Higdon and 
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Court has not only thoroughly researched and analyzed the issue once, 
but rather, twice. 168 
In light of this analysis of the Higdon and McNeff decisions, any 
reliance upon an exception to a rule of statutory stare decisis rooted in 
the inadequacy of precedent seems unsustainable. The Mesa Verde 
court's decision cannot be justified on the ground that the Supreme 
Court failed to thoroughly consider the issue of the voidability of a 
prehire agreement. Consequently, the next exception to statutory 
stare decisis must be reviewed to determine whether the Mesa Verde 
decision falls within its purview. Therefore, an examination of the de­
gree to which Congress left the development of the statute to the 
courts is required. 
2. 	 Degree to Which Congress Left Developmeni of the 
Statutory Scheme to the Judiciary 
Some justices have argued that the statutory presumption of cor­
rectness should be relaxed when dealing with broad congressional stat­
utes, akin to general statements of policy, where Congress has left to 
the courts the job of filling in the details of the statute. 169 This gradual 
statutory development would occur in a common law style. Justice 
Stevens once wrote that "when the Court unequivocally rejects one 
reading of a statute, its action should be respected in future litiga­
tion."I7O Justice Stevens later qualified this statement: "[l]ike most, 
this proposition of law is not wholly without exceptions. Congress 
phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms, expecting the 
federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by­
case basis in the common-law tradition."171 
The rationale for this exception is straightforward. When Con­
gress has declared a broad, sweeping policy, the courts are assigned 
McNeff, although the Court may have given deference to the Board's interpretation in do­
ing so."). 
168. In general, when a case involves an administrative agency, a court may articu­
late its opinion as deference to the agency, when in fact it just simply agrees with the 
agency. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 61. The court may also state that the interpre­
tative rule is controlling, that it has great weight, or that it must be given effect unless it is 
unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute. Id. at 60-61. Should the court disagree with 
the agency, it will simply dismiss the interpretative rule by declaring that it is entitled to no 
weight. Id. Consequently, the judicial verbiage in deciding the proper weight to afford an 
interpretative rule "is not necessarily to be taken literally." Id. at 61. This is because the 
verbalisms are "usually overstated" in the direction with which the court agrees. Id. at 64. 
169. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1377-81. 
170. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,641 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
171. 	 Id. at 641 n.12. 
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the task of shaping the boundaries of that policy on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, when the courts conduct this common law process, they 
overrule prior decisions which are inconsistent with the general con­
gressional policy, or they overrule unworkable rules. I72 This overrul­
ing is done in the same manner as the overruling of any common law 
precedent. 
When this exception is applied to Mesa Verde, the question be­
comes what is the extent that Congress has left the job of developing 
the NLRA to the courts. While the text of the NLRA and its legisla­
tive history are both extensive,!73 not every possible situation was pro­
vided for under the Act.174 Consequently, some aspects of the statute 
were left to the courts to interpret, with the aid of the agency's inter­
pretative rules.17S Since Congress did leave some decisions to the 
courts, a judicial precedent should be overruled only when the prece­
dent is inconsistent with congressional intent or provides an unwork­
able rule. 
The Higdon Court thoroughly analyzed the congressional intent 
and held that prehire agreements are susceptible to unilateral repudia­
tion. 176 In addition, in McNeff, the Court had a further opportunity to 
examine the issue of the voidability of prehire agreements. In that 
case, the McNeff Court went to great lengths to prove that the legisla­
tive intent called for the voidability of prehire agreements. 177 In ana­
lyzing the legislative history, the Court looked to the statute, prior 
case law, House reports and Senate reports.l78 Nowhere in its McNeff 
opinion did the Court even suggest that the Higdon Court might have 
inaccurately read the NLRA's legislative history as it applied to 
prehire agreements. 
Since the legislative history was accurately applied, Higdon 
should be overruled only if the rule it adopts is unworkable. Obvi­
ously, if the rule were unworkable, its deficiencies would have become 
apparent during the five years between the Higdon and McNeff deci­
sions. In fact, in Higdon, the union argued that the Court's rule was 
unworkable because the voidability· of section 8(f) agreements made 
172. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1377-81. 
173. For language of selected sections of the Act, see supra notes 42, 44, 74 & 80. 
174. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 129 (1944); see supra notes 
45-51 and accompanying text. 
175. For more information on the relationship between the courts and agencies, see 
supra notes 9-20, 41-61 and accompanying text. 
176. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 346-49 (1978). 
177. Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 265-71 (1983). 
178. Id. 
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them virtually unenforceable. 179 The Court, however, seemed uncon­
cerned with, or at least unpersuaded by, this argument and quickly 
disposed of the issue. ISO 
Thus, McNeff again thoroughly analyzed the reasoning behind 
Higdon and did not find that the legislative history was applied incor­
rectly or that the rule was unworkable. Recent conclusions by the 
Ninth Circuit that the legislative history was applied incorrectly and 
that the rule is unworkable, coming after the Board's change of posi­
tion, seem more rooted in a need to justify a dramatic departure from 
Supreme Court precedent than in an unbiased appraisal of the 
voidability of prehire agreements. Hence, the second exception to the 
strong presumption of correctness does not apply to the situation in 
Mesa Verde. 
3. Extent of Public and Private Reliance 
The third exception to the rule of statutory stare decisis occurs 
when there has been little reliance on the Court's interpretation. lSI 
Courts presume that Congress relies on the judicial decision unless 
Congress amends or repeals the statute. lS2 
Not only is Congress presumed to have relied upon the judicial 
decision, but private parties are also presumed to have relied upon 
it. ls3 After the Supreme Court ruled twice that prehire agreements 
were voidable unless and until the union attained majority support, 
both labor and management presumably relied upon this fact. 184 Most 
179. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. 
180. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351. The union argued that the Board's position allowing 
an employer to unilaterally repudiate a prehire agreement until the Union attained majority 
status rendered the contract unenforceable, which was contrary to the Court's prior deci­
sion in Retail Clerks Int'I Ass'n v. Lions Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). The Court 
did not address the workability of prehire agreements because it limited the Retail Clerks 
decision to one of jurisdiction. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351-52; see supra note 159. 
181. Examples of the Court's willingness to overrule a statutory precedent due to 
slight private reliance and subsequent contrary legislation include: Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279-88 (1988); Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1984); Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 
497-98 (1973). 
182. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382 ("Where Congress itself has relied on a prece­
dent, the precedent may be entitled to a super-strong presumption of correctness. "); see 
supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
183. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382 ("Where private parties have over time shaped 
their relations around a precedent's rule, it is considered presumptively unfair to change 
the precedent ... , and courts will not do so without strong reason. "); see supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
184. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local Union 953 v. Mar-len of La., Inc., 
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employers and unions know their rights in this legal arena. 
Prehire agreements were authorized by Congress because of the 
unique needs of the construction industry.t8s The fact that the use of 
prehire agreements was codified suggests that their use is widespread. 
If this is true, then it would be logical that parties who knew they 
could legally enter an agreement would also know of their equally im­
portant ability to legally repudiate them, at least until the union at­
tained majority status. 
Thus far, there is no compelling reason to warrant a 'deviation 
from the strong presumption of correctness afforded statutory prece­
dents. None of the traditional exceptions to statutory stare decisis are 
applicable. The only other justification for the Mesa Verde decision 
would be if the need to defer to the NLRB outweighed the considera­
tions of precedent. There are several different circumstances under 
which Mesa Verde's deference to the NLRB would be warranted. 
These circumstances are discussed below. 
B. Agency Deference 
There are several different circumstances under which courts will 
defer to an agency, thus implementing the agency's interpretative rule. 
Courts may give the interpretative rule authoritative effect if the rule 
were outstanding when the statute was reenactedl86 or if the rule were 
made contemporaneously with the statute.187 Likewise, courts look to 
such factors as when the interpretative rule was actually created and 
the consistency of the agency's position.188 
When applying these factors to this case, one can see that the 
906 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1990) (The contractor "entered into its pre-hire agreements 
with the unions relying on its then-existing right to repudiate unilaterally the agreements so 
long as the unions had not achieved majority status."). 
185. See supra note 73. 
186. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59. 
187. Id.; see Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978) 
(contemporaneous construction of a statute warrants "considerable weight"); Adamo 
Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contempOraneous construction of a 
statute receives "peculiar weight" (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 294, 315 (1933»); Center For Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (An administrative interpretation that is made contemporaneously with the statute 
receives high deference because it "presumably ... is unlikely to have been either informed 
or coerced by the enacting legislature's genuine intent."). 
188. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 167 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
("Both consistency and contemporaneous construction increase the amount of deference to 
be given to an agency's interpretation."); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 
443,450 (1978) ("This longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is entitled 
to considerable weight."); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) 
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creation of the Board's new interpretative rule occurred fairly recently 
and not at the time of the enactment of the statute. The rule was 
actually announced in 1987 by the Deklewa 189 court. Not only is the 
interpretive rule of recent origin, but it is absolutely contradictory to 
the previous NLRB interpretation of the statute. 
Although agencies are not disqualified from changing their inter­
pretation, more weight is given to an agency's interpretative rule when 
that rule has remained constant over the years. l90 Here, the NLRB 
did not maintain a consistent interpretative rule. Yet, even after ac­
knowledging these changes in the interpretative rule, the Mesa Verde 
court still deferred to the agency. 
Granting this much deference to the Board implies that there is a 
dynamic congressional intent or even no congressional intent. 191 Im­
plementing all the Board's interpretative rules simply because they are 
a reasonable interpretation of the statute implies that there is not just 
one true legislative intent, but rather a range of legislative intents 
which the Board is free to rely on at its discretion. One of the func­
tions of the NLRB is to effectuate national labor policy; however, it is 
for Congress and not the Board to define and determine this policy. 192 
"[W]here Congress has adopted a selective system for dealing with 
[labor] evils, the [Labor Relations] Board is confined to that system. 
("We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted 
with earlier pronouncements of the agency."). 
In addition to the consistency of the agency's position, courts also look to the extent of 
the agency's expertise. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (citing General 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976»; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231-37 
(1974); Skidmore v. Swift &. Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (timing, consistency and exper­
tise are all factors to be considered when determining the deference to give an administra­
tive interpretation); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &. Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25 (1977) 
(The Court noted the need for deference in light of "the complexity and technical nature of 
the statutes and the subjects they regulate ... and [the] EPA's unique experience and 
expertise ...." (quoting American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 450 n.16 (7th Cir. 
1975»); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) ("Where the issue [of statutory construction] presented involves questions of scien­
tific expertise . . . we defer to the Administrator's interpretation."). This factor is less 
important in this case because expertise alone, without some additional justification, would 
not justify deference. . 
189. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &. Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 
v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir,), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) ("Deklewa"). 
190. See supra note 188. 
191. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 
1124, 1147 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cerro denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 
(1990). 
192. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. 
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965) ("[W]e think that the Board construes its functions too 
expansively when it claims general authority to define national labor policy by balancing 
the competing interests of labor and management."). 
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[T]he Board cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive 
regulatory scheme."193 The Board cannot adopt a policy which will 
frustrate or defeat the congressional policy; 194 nor can it ignore other 
equally important congressional objectives. 195 Because the court must 
read a statute in the way that best reflects its meaning, courts are far 
slower than agencies to overrule their own previous decisions. 196 "By 
contrast, agencies can change their outlook as often and easily as a 
chameleon changes its color. A change of administration may prompt 
an executive department to alter its position on a particular piece of 
legislation overnight."197 In addition, "appointment of a single com­
missioner may drastically change the agency's approach to its organic 
statute."198 
Courts should be slow to overturn Board decisions, but they are 
not left to wholly accept them.l99 Courts are not obligated to stand 
aside and rubber-stamp Board decisions that are inconsistent with a 
statutory mandate or which defeat or frustrate the congressional statu­
tory policy. 200 Courts would not be fulfilling judicial obligations if 
they did not fully review Board decisions. 201 
Thus, the Mesa Verde court is bound to do more than make a 
cursory determination of the reasonableness of the Board's interpreta­
tive rule. It should follow judicial precedent in appropriate situations. 
It should take into account the factors of timing, consistency, and ad­
herence to the congressional policy underlying section 8(f) of the 
NLRA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Mesa Verde court set aside Supreme Court precedent too 
swiftly. The court virtually ignored stare decisis, and did not address 
the strong presumption of correctness typically granted to statutory 
193. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 u.s. 667, 676 (1961) (citation 
omitted). 
194. NLRB v. Appleton Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1961). 
195. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,47 (1942). 
196. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 




199. NLRB V. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. V. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 
(1945). 
200. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1146 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. 
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precedent. Because the strong presumption of correctness applies, it 
should be deviated from only in the most unusual of circumstances. 
After analyzing the exceptions which would warrant a departure from 
this presumption, the situation in Mesa Verde does not rise to the level 
of a justifiable deviation. Since there is no reason to depart from statu­
tory precedent, the Supreme Court precedents in Higdon and McNeff 
should have been respected. 
In addition to the lack of justification for a departure from the 
doctrine of stare decisis, there was no compelling reason to deviate 
from the Supreme Court precedents under the agency deference doc­
trine. The Mesa Verde court did not take into account several factors 
usually associated with the judicial review of agency interpretations, 
for example, timing and consistency. The Mesa Verde rule simply 
forces the judiciary to defer to the agency so long as the agency's inter­
pretation of the statute is reasonable. Because there is no justifiable 
departure from Supreme Court precedent under either stare decisis or 
agency deference, the Mesa Verde court should have followed the 
McNeff and Higdon decisions. 
Martha Allard 
